Jackson's Analytical Moral Functionalism

2
We begin by briefly summarizing Jackson"s theory. He proposes to construe moral terms like "goodness" and "rightness" in much the same way that the mentalistic terms of folk psychology are construed by the first-order version of the position in philosophy of mind called analytical functionalism. According to first-order analytical functionalism about the mental-as articulated, for instance, by D. M. Armstrong (1968 Armstrong ( , 1970 and David Lewis (1966 Lewis ( , 1972 Lewis ( , 1980 )-mental-state terms are functionally definable via the principles of common-sense psychology, and these terms refer not to second-order functional properties but rather to certain neurophysical properties that fill the roles specified by the functional definitions.
Jackson"s approach involves four central ideas. First, he posits what he calls "folk morality", something whose (partly implicit) mastery he takes to be required for competence in the use of moral concepts:
In the case of the mind, we have a network of interconnected and interdefinable concepts that get their identity through their place in the network…. The network itself is the theory known as folk psychology, a theory we have a partly tacit and partly explicit grasp of…. In the case of ethics, we have folk morality: the network of moral opinions, intuitions, principles, and concepts whose mastery is part and parcel of having a sense of what is right and wrong, and of being able to engage in meaningful debate about what ought to be done…. Moral functionalism, then, is the view that the meanings of the moral terms are given by their place in this network… (130) Second, he claims that interpersonal commonality of meaning for moral terms requires that all parties are using moral terms in a way that reflects a mastery (partly implicit) of one and the same folk morality-which he calls mature folk morality. He also assumes that this prerequisite is satisfied in the case of humans, while acknowledging that if it is not then his account would need to be relativized:
I have spoken as if there will be, at the end of the day, some sort of convergence of moral opinion in the sense that mature folk morality will be a single network…accepted by the community as a whole. Indeed, I take it that it is part of current folk morality that convergence will or would occur…. But this may turn out to be, as a matter of fact, false.
Indeed, some hold that we know enough now about moral disagreement to know that convergence will (would) not occur. In this case, there will not be a single mature folk morality but rather different mature folk moralities for different groups in the community; 3 and to the extent that they differ, the adherents of the different mature folk moralities will mean something different by the moral vocabulary…. I set this complication aside in what follows. I will assume what I hope and believe is the truth of the matter, namely that there will (would) be convergence. But if this is a mistake, what I say in what follows should be read has having implicit relativization clauses built into it. (137) Third, he claims that moral terms have conceptual analyses that result by applying the method of defining theoretical terms developed by David Lewis (1970) . The idea is first to characterize a system of properties that together conform to the principles of the theory-in this case, the principles of mature folk morality-and then to characterize each member of the system by its place within the whole. Jackson writes:
Let M be mature folk morality. Imagine it written out as a long conjunction with the moral predicates written in property name style. For example, "Killing someone is typically wrong" because "Killing typically has the property of being wrong". Replace each distinct moral property term by a distinct variable to give M(x 1 , x 2 , . . .). Then "(x 1 )
. where "x r " replaced "being right" in M. We now have our account of when A is right: it is right just in case it has the property that plays the rightness role as specified by the right hand side of (R)… (140-1) Fourth, he maintains that certain first-order natural properties fill the respective roles that define the respective moral terms, and hence that moral terms denote these role-filling natural properties. (He remains neutral, and he says that mature folk morality is itself neutral, as to whether moral terms denote such role-filling natural properties rigidly or non-rigidly.) Here the key line of thought is this: by virtue of the a priori supervenience of the ethical on the descriptive, each moral term is necessarily coextensive with some natural property, viz., the disjunction of all natural supervenience-base properties for the moral term. That property is the role-filler, and hence is the referent-property of the moral term. (Jackson holds that necessarilycoextensive properties are identical, but he also offers independent arguments, including parsimony considerations, in support of the proposed property-identities; see pp. 125-8.)
Trouble: Moral Twin Earth 3
Competent wielders of language and concepts have substantial intuitive mastery of the semantic norms governing the terms of the language they employ and the concepts those terms express-just as they have substantial intuitive mastery of the syntactic norms governing their language. Implicit mastery of the semantic workings of the term "water" and the concept it expresses, for instance, presumably is reflected in people"s strong intuitions about Putnam"s Twin Earth scenario: e.g., the intuition that Twin Earthers do not mean by their and "bad", "right" and "wrong" to evaluate actions, persons, institutions, and so forth (at least those who speak Twin English use these terms, whereas those who speak some other Twin language use terms orthographically identical to the terms for good, etc., in the corresponding Earth language). In fact, were a group of explorers from Earth ever to visit Moral Twin Earth they would be strongly inclined to translate the Moral Twin Earth terms "good", "right", and the rest as identical to their own orthographically identical English terms. After all, the uses of these terms on Moral Twin Earth bear all the formal marks that are usually taken to characterize moral 7 vocabulary and moral practice. In particular, the terms are used to reason about considerations bearing on the well being of persons on Moral Twin Earth; Moral Twin Earth people are normally disposed to act in certain ways corresponding to judgments about what is "good" and "right"; they normally take considerations about what is "good" and "right" to be especially important, even of overriding importance in most cases, in deciding what to do; and so on.
Let us suppose that investigation into Twin English twin-moral discourse and associated practice reveals that Twin Earthers all would converge, under ideal reflective inquiry, to a mature folk morality that is nonconsequentialist, and thus is distinct from the consequentialist mature folk morality to which (we are supposing) Earthers would all converge. Suppose too that Twin
Earthly mature folk morality is best systematized by some specific deontological normative Earthers would be genuine disagreements-i.e., disagreements in moral belief and in normative moral theory, rather than differences in meaning.
We submit that by far the more natural and plausible mode of description, when one considers the Moral Twin Earth scenario, is the second. Reflection on the scenario just does not generate hermeneutical pressure to construe Moral Twin Earth uses of "good" and "right" as not translatable by the orthographically identical terms of English. But if AMF were true, and moral terms had the kinds of conceptual analyses that Jackson claims they do, then reflection on this scenario ought to generate intuitions analogous to those generated in Putnam"s original Twin
Earth scenario. I.e., it should seem intuitively natural to say that we have here a difference in meaning and that the twin-moral terms of Twin English are not translatable by English moral terms. But when it comes to characterizing the differences between Earthers and Moral Twin
Earthers on this matter, by far the more natural-seeming thing to say is that the differences involve belief and theory, not meaning. scenario, the two groups learn that they have respectively been using "water" to refer to two different physical kind-properties, it would be silly for them to think they have differing views about the real nature of water.) But such inter-group debate would surely strike both groups not as silly but as quite appropriate, because they would regard one another as differing in moral beliefs and moral theory, not in meaning.
Since semantic norms are tapped by human linguistic and conceptual competence, and since the relevant competence is presumably reflected in one"s intuitive judgments concerning Twin Earth scenarios, these intuitions about Moral Twin Earth constitute strong empirical evidence against AMF. Barring overwhelmingly strong reasons to think otherwise, the best explanation of the intuitive judgments is a non-debunking explanation that treats them as the products of semantic competence, and hence as veridical. And if indeed they are veridical, then analytical moral functionalism is false.
An Unappealing Fallback
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Briefly stated, the problem with Jackson"s position is that it is guilty of chauvinistic conceptual relativism-that is, it is committed to the claiming that actual or possible agents who But the trouble with this idea is that the kinds of platitudinous, non-tendentious, generalizations that clearly count as constitutive of people"s common sense understanding of moral terms and concepts are simply not sufficient to pin down determinate referents for them.
One can distinguish between formal and substantive moral platitudes. Formal moral platitudes would include those generalizations that link moral terms and concepts to one another and thus express definitional connections among them-for instance, "If an action is wrong, all things considered, then one ought not, all things considered, perform that action" and "If an action is morally permissible, all things considered, then it is not morally wrong, all things considered, to perform that action." There are also those formal moral platitudes that represent features of the so-called "logic of moral discourse", like the principle of universalizability: "If an action is right (or wrong) for one agent to perform in certain circumstances, then it is right (or wrong) for any similar agent in similar circumstances." Substantive moral platitudes would be ones that apparently link moral concepts more directly to non-moral ones. Many philosophers have claimed that there are such substantive platitudes, for instance, "Right actions are concerned to promote or sustain or contribute in some way to human flourishing" and "Right actions are expressive of equal concern and respect."
But formal considerations alone clearly are not enough to secure determinate referents for moral terms and concepts; in general, such a priori constraints are compatible with any of a great variety of normative moral theories that deliver incompatible verdicts about numerous specific moral issues. Nor will appeal to substantive moral platitudes (together with the formal ones) suffice to produce referential determinacy. Consider, for example, the lately mentioned generalizations involving flourishing and impartiality. The generic notions of flourishing and impartiality are quite vague, and thereby can be construed very differently within competing, incompatible, moral theories. Let us focus for a moment on the notion of impartiality-the idea that everyone is to be accorded equal respect. The problem of appealing to this notion is that it lacks sufficient determinacy to serve as an anchor to uniquely pin down referents for moral terms. James Griffin brings out the point nicely:
Every moral theory has the notion of equal respect at its heart: regarding each person as, on some sense, on an equal footing with every other one. Different moral theories parlay this vague notion into different conceptions. Ideas such as the Ideal Observer or the Ideal
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Contractor specify the notion a little further, but then they too are very vague and allow quite different moral theories to be got out of them. And the moral theories are not simply derivations from these vague notions, because the notions are too vague to allow anything as tight as a derivation. Too vague, but not totally empty; although the moral theories that we end up with put content into all these notions, the notions themselves also do something toward shaping the theories. (Griffin 1986, 208) Talk of flourishing is vague in just the same way. Moreover, the same will be true of other notions that, like equal respect and flourishing, might plausibly be understood as part of the very concept of moral thought and discourse. So it does not appear that moral platitudes alone can collectively generate Lewis-style functional definitions that fix determinate referents for terms like "goodness", "rightness", and "fairness". As Michael Smith (1994) remarks, "These platitudes need not and should not be thought of fixing a unique content or substance for moral reasons all by themselves, rather they simply serve to tell us when we are in the ballpark of moral reasons, as opposed to the ballpark of non-moral reasons" (p. 184); for further substantiation of this claim, see Smith"s own discussion.
One might try maintaining (i) that the indeterminacy here described involves only relatively few borderline hard cases about which competing moral theories would disagree, and
(ii) that these cases can be comfortably relegated to the category "no moral fact of the matter."
But actually the resulting indeterminacy of truth-value would be massive, since it would extend to virtually any kind of case about which there is actual or potential moral disagreement.
Acceptance of similar-looking, superficially substantive, platitudinous principles by people with differing moral values does very little to secure agreement about concrete cases, because the concepts that feature in such principles-equal respect, for instance-are apt to be applied to objectionable relativism on one hand, or objectionable indeterminacy on the other.
The Full Extent of Jackson's Chauvinistic Conceptual Relativism
Earlier we granted, for the sake of argument, Jackson"s optimistic assumption that there is a single mature folk morality to which all humans would converge under ideal reflection. In adapting our generic recipe for cooking up specific Moral Twin Earth counterexamples against specific versions of naturalist moral realism, we argued that even if the optimistic assumption is true, Jackson"s analytic moral functionalism is untenable anyway; for, it chauvinistically builds into moral concepts the specific mature folk morality that supposedly would be converged upon by all Earthers, thereby wrongly entailing that Moral Twin Earthers lack the moral concepts that we Earthers possess.
But it is entirely possible-we think likely-that different humans would converge to different mature folk moralities under ideal reflection. Prima facie, this is the most plausible explanation of the persistent, recalcitrant-looking, actual moral disagreements that commonly exist within humankind. As we pointed out in section 1, Jackson is unflinching in the face of this possibility: he is prepared to extend his conceptual relativism to different human subgroups, if necessary. As he says (in a passage quoted earlier) about the possibility that convergence to a single folk morality would not occur, "In this case, there will be not a single mature folk morality but rather different mature folk moralities for different groups in the community; and to the extent that they differ, the adherents of the different mature folk moralities will mean something different by the moral vocabulary" (137).
This is a very large bullet to bite. Jackson"s position entails that apparent moral disagreements among humans with deeply differing moral values are merely apparent: the different parties are expressing different concepts with their moral terms, are talking past one another rather than disagreeing, and often are both right given what they respectively mean by their moral terms. This conceptual-relativist construal of such apparent moral disagreements is wildly contrary to the common sense, intuitive, way of understanding such situations. Common sense, and ordinary discursive practice, construe the appearances as veridical: the parties in such a dispute are employing common moral concepts, are using moral terms with common meaning, and are engaged in a deep and genuine disagreement in moral belief. Barring some overwhelmingly strong reason to think that this common sense construal of such cases is mistaken, the enormous size of the bullet Jackson is biting constitutes a further strong consideration against his position. (This is an extension of, and a further strengthening of, the lesson of Moral Twin Earth; the point is that deep moral disagreements of the kind described in the Moral Twin Earth scenario very probably exist right here on Earth.)
Non-Descriptivist Cognitivism vs. Analytical Moral Functionalism
We do not claim to have conclusively refuted Jackson"s metaethical position; conclusive arguments are rare in philosophy. Philosophical theories, like scientific theories, should be evaluated in terms of their overall theoretical benefits and costs-and so should be evaluated comparatively, with an eye on benefits and costs of the competing philosophical theories on the conceptual landscape. Bullet-biting can be appropriate, if the advocates of competing theories all must bite even bigger bullets. Thus, how telling our negative arguments are against Jackson ultimately depends in part upon what available alternative metaethical theories exist, and upon the viability of those alternatives. In this section we locate our case against AMF within a wider dialectical setting, by briefly comparing it with the metaethical position we ourselves favor-a version of non-descriptivism.
Non-descriptivists maintain that the overall declarative content of a moral judgment or a moral sentence is not descriptive content: such a judgment or sentence does not represent the world as being a certain way. Jackson, following the usual tradition in metaethics, uses the term "non-cognitivism" for non-descriptivism. He says this about non-descriptivism, thus labeled:
It is only under the assumption of cognitivism that ethics presents a location problem. If the non-cognitivists are right and ethical sentences do not represent things as being a certain way, there is no question of how to locate the way they represent things as being in relation to how accounts told in other terms-descriptive, physical, social, or whatever-represent things as being…. Although I cannot rule out non-cognitivism simply by noting that ethical sentences are meaningful and syntactically right for truth, I
do think it is very much a "last resort" position. (117) Elsewhere (Timmons 1999 chapter 4, Horgan and Timmons 2000b, in press a, in press b, forthcoming), we ourselves have articulated and defended a version of non-descriptivism that we maintain is not a "last resort" position at all, but rather is more plausible than the various other metathical positions currently on offer. We call this view both "non-descriptivist cognitivism"
and "cognitivist expressivism"; here we adopt the former name. We now present an extremely truncated sketch of this position.
Non-descriptivist cognitivism makes the following claims.
(1) Contrary to non-cognitivist views like emotivism and prescriptivism, moral judgments are genuine beliefs, and utterances of moral sentences are genuine assertions. (The label "non-cognitivism" fits emotivism and prescriptivism because these views deny that moral judgments are beliefs, and instead treat them as non-cognitive states-for instance, as conative states of approval or disapproval.) (2) Contrary to descriptivist views, the overall declarative content of moral beliefs and assertions is not descriptive content: these beliefs and assertions do not represent things as being a certain way. belief that Bush is U.S. President), affirmative ought-commitments (e.g., the belief that it ought to be that Gore is U.S. President), negative is-commitments (e.g., the belief that it"s not the case that Gore is U.S. President), and negative ought-commitments (e.g., the belief that it ought not to be the case that Bush is U.S. President). (5) conforms to the Tarski T-schema, and thus normally constitutes a fusion of moral and semantic evaluation; such a morally engaged truth ascription is a meta-level expression of a moral belief (i.e., an ought-commitment), and hence is itself non-descriptive in overall declarative content (as is the first-order moral judgment or statement to which truth is ascribed). It may be objected that even when all the negotiation and critical reflection is over and we have arrived at mature folk morality, it would still make perfect sense to doubt that 19 the right is what occupies the rightness role. But now I think that we analytical descriptivists are entitled to dig in our heels and insist that the idea that what fits the bill that well might still fail to be rightness, is nothing more than a hangover from the platonist conception that the meaning of the term "right" is somehow a matter of its picking out, or being somehow mysteriously attached to, the form of the right. (151) But of course the open question argument has long been employed by non-descriptivists, and not merely by non-naturalist moral realists, against naturalist moral realism. The argument has considerable intuitive force, and indeed is closely related in spirit to our own Moral Twin Earth argument; see Horgan and Timmons (1992a) . Even granting the (dubious) assumption that all humans would converge upon a single mature folk morality, there is nothing especially platonistic about the claim that some possible agent who employs the same moral concepts that humans do-e.g., a Moral Twin Earther-could intelligibly doubt, of a natural property that the agent knows fits the rightness role that is functionally defined by the mature folk morality of humans, whether this natural property is identical to rightness. On the contrary, to insist that there could be no such moral agent is to be guilty of conceptual chauvinism.
1 See Horgan and Timmons (1991 , 1992a , 1992b , 1996a , 1996b , 2000a and Timmons (1999 chapter 2).
2 All citations to Jackson, in this section and throughout the paper, refer to Jackson (1998). 20 these arguments are dubbed "low-grade a priori" because they rest on data that is armchair-accessible, such as one"s own semantic intuitions.
5 In order to forestall any attempt to parlay this postulated difference into a basis for resisting the argument we are about to give, let us further stipulate (i) that the difference is merely a matter of initial psychological tendencies within Twin Earthers and Earthers respectively, (ii) that these tendencies are psychologically malleable in both groups, and thus (iii) that both groups are plastic with respect to how their moral sensibilities get molded, rather than being "hard-wired." Thus, for both groups it is true that if certain cultural developments were to transpire, then the members of the group would develop an altered moral sensibility and would sustain this change via alterations in moral education. For instance, if someone like Peter Singer were to exert widespread influence on Moral Twin Earth, then the Moral Twin
Earthers would develop and sustain a utilitarian moral sensibility. Or, if the concept of sin were to become ubiquitously influential on Earth, then Earthers would develop and sustain a deontological moral sensibility. (We ourselves would argue not only that human moral psychology is indeed malleable in this way, but also that such differences in moral sensibilities and in associated modes of moral education are abundantly present right here on Earth. But remember that we are currently granting, for the sake of argument, Jackson"s optimistic assumption that there is a single mature folk morality to which all Earthers would converge under ideal reflection.) 6 Parts of this section are adapted, with minor modifications, from section 5 of Horgan and Timmons (1996a) and from section 2 of Horgan and Timmons (2000a) . 7 Assuming that the relevant first-order states are different in Martians than in humans (say, because
Martians are composed of silicon rather than organic molecules), a first-order version of analytical functionalism will need to construe mental state-names as population-specific nonrigid designators in order to accommodate Martian mentality. David Lewis explicitly took this tack in Lewis (1980) . implicit, contextually variable, semantic parameters, and that in the case of moral beliefs and assertions, any of three distinct uses of the truth predicate can be semantically sanctioned in a specific context: (1) a morally engaged disquotational use, expressive of one"s own moral beliefs, (2) a morally disengaged, nondisquotational, correspondence use, under which only beliefs and assertions whose overall declarative content is descriptive can be true or false, and (3) a morally disengaged, nondisquotational, overtly relativistic use, under which truth ascriptions get explicitly relativized to the moral standards of some specific person or group. When non-descriptivists assert that moral judgments and statements are neither true nor false (as we ourselves sometimes do), the truth predicate is being employed in manner (2) rather than manner (1). This is not inconsistent with using the truth predicate disquotationally vis-à-vis moral claims, although one cannot use it both ways in one breath. Also, when the truch predicate is used in the third, overtly relativized, manner, typically one is simply making a descriptive remark about what the standards of some person or group imply about the moral status of a type of action or an act token. Again, using the truth predicate this way on one occasion is not inconsistent with using it disquotationally (or correspondence-wise) on another. 
